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Abstract  
 
The role of grain storage by inventory holders or government agencies in managing price volatility 
has received a great deal of attention. But the role of on-farm storage on price volatility is not so 
richly documented, in spite of its importance in rural areas in Africa.  In this paper, we merge 
historical price and household data on maize markets in Burkina Faso to measure the influence of on-
farm storage on price volatility.  We show how the seasonal management of on-farm storage is 
responsible for price volatility. We focus in particular on the analysis of carry-over and its impact on 
price pattern. In an inter-temporal analysis, an unexpected price drop is followed by a decrease in 
production and tends to stabilize price to its original level. But in a seasonal pattern, an unexpected 
price drop occurring during the planting season simply delays the sale of existing stocks, without 
decreasing the production, which generates further price drops later in the year, generally right 
before the harvest or during the harvest time. We establish that on-farm carryover increases the 
occurrence of unexpected price drops after harvest.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The 2007-2008 sharp rises in food prices in developing countries recalled that price volatility 
had not been fully understood. In the recent years, much attention has been devoted to explain 
volatility on international markets by exogenous supply shocks (drought) and sharp changes in 
demand (Asia) and supply (biofuels, gas prices), etc. (FAO, IFAD et al. 2011; Prakash 2011). If most of 
the studies focused on international price volatility, some studies focused on domestic price volatility 
in developing countries and its determinants (Hazell, Shields et al. 2005; Demeke, Pangrazio et al. 
2008; Tschirley and Jayne 2010). Among those determinants, price transmission has been widely 
used as a key concept to explain how volatile international food prices can create domestic volatile 
food price (Daviron, Aubert et al. 2009; Torero 2009). However, several studies demonstrated that 
domestic price volatility can be weakly correlated with international price volatility, notably in the 
cases of landlocked countries that do not depend on international trade (Hazell, Shields et al. 2005; 
David-Benz, Diallo et al. 2010). This is the case in Burkina Faso, where maize prices are weakly 
integrated with international maize prices (Figure1). For instance, the sharp increase in burkinabè 
maize prices by mid 2005 was attributable to a poor harvest in 2004 (production devastated by locust 
invasion) and has not been mitigated by steady international price. The same occurred by mid 2009 
where previous maize harvest in Burkina was affected by drought. However, they may have been at 
least a case of price transmission from international markets to burkinabè markets in 2008 that 
corresponds to a low harvest in 2007 in Burkina so the country had to import high price maize from 
international markets to meet its domestic demand. All this suggests that price volatility in Burkina 
Faso does not find its main origin in international markets.  
 
Figure 1. International and Burkinabe maize nominal prices (USD/ton)                                                
(from FAO and SONAGESS data) 
 
 
Several authors have shown that domestic factors play a major role in explaining price 
volatility, including domestic production shocks, stock levels and policy interventions (Hazell, Shields 
et al. 2005; Byerlee, Jayne et al. 2006; Tschirley and Jayne 2010). There is also an important literature 
on the role of inventory on price dynamics (Williams and Wright 1991; Deaton and Laroque 1992), 
and even on price volatility specifically (Serra and Gil 2013). This literature does not look at the role 
that on-farm stocks themselves could play on farm volatility.  A key feature of this literature rests on 
the optimal inventory theory, based on the “buy low, sell high” principle (Gustafson 1958). This is the 
key reason why inventory holders behavior tend to compensate for price moves, except when they 
have sold their whole inventory and price still increase (Deaton and Laroque, 1992). For these 
authors, this is the root of a price asymmetric dynamics (“sharper increases than decreases”).  
Farmers’ behavior regarding stocks and prices completely departs from optimal inventory 
theory. First, they hardly ever buy grains but for their own consumption in the lean season if they 
lack grains and can afford them. But this is not a strong difference, because it can simply be 
explained by different constraints. The main difference relies in the fact that their selling dynamic 
throughout the year is cyclical, creating (i) a price seasonality (ii) a risk of unexpected sharp price 
decrease toward the end of the lean season, due to carryover. Contrary to the inventory holder 
indeed, farmers have a cyclical pattern in mind in which “everything has to be sold by the end of the 
cropping season”.  Although this is not rigorously true for every farmer, it is true for many, leading 
many of them to sell too early, far before the end of the cropping year. We show how this behavior, 
combined with price anticipation errors,  explains why on-farm stocks do not mitigate prices drop as 
they can mitigate prices increase (contrary to the optimal inventory theory). According to us, the role 
of on-farm storage management on domestic price volatility might have been underestimated, and is 
probably not fully understood yet, at least in rural Africa.  
We model a cyclical pattern of sales, in which the farmer makes his trading plan after harvest 
for the all coming year. His preference for the present typically favors early sales which, combined 
with a stable demand, produces increasing prices. If these prices are as expected by the farmer, no 
volatility episode occurs. If these prices increase more than he expected, he reevaluates his selling 
plan, sells a bit earlier than expected, which tends to smoothen the price increase. But if the price 
increases less than he thought, he reevaluates his selling plan and sells less than expected, waiting 
for better prices. If this type of anticipation error happens just before the new harvest, he fails to sell 
his whole resource on time, generating a carry-over, which further feed the excess supply of the new 
harvest, and finally generates unexpected price drops.   
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To empirically test this in Burkina Faso, we use an ARCH model to build two series of positive 
and negative volatility in 16 local markets and we build upon a panel approach to find that carryover 
has a significant effect on increasing negative volatility.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, we review the economic literature on the 
influence of storage on price volatility. In section 2, we model the dynamics of stocks on a one-year 
schedule and we illustrate the impact of a late price-anticipation error on price negative volatility, 
defined by unexpected price drops. In section 3, we present the ARCH model used to measure 
positive and negative price volatility and describe the panel used to establish the relationship 
between on-farm storage and . In section 4, we introduce the Burkina Faso case by describing the 
data we used on price and storage behavior. Lastly, in section 5, we estimate the panel where price 
volatility is regressed over carry-outs, and provide empirical evidence that carry-outs increase 
unexpected price drops.  
 
 
1. The effect of storage on price volatility in the literature 
 
Food price volatility 
There are several definitions of food price volatility in the economic literature (Huchet-
Bourdon 2011; Piot-Lepetit and M'Barek 2011; Prakash 2011). They tend to differentiate price 
variation from  price volatility, because of the damages to economic agents related to volatility and/ 
or the inability of those agents to anticipate price volatility. International institutional authorities 
define volatility as follows: “Variations in prices become problematic when they are large and cannot 
be anticipated and, as a result, create a level of uncertainty which increases risks for producers, 
traders, consumers and governments and may lead to sub-optimal decisions” (FAO, IFAD et al. 2011). 
This definition assumes that price variations may be detrimental to agents when they are not 
predictable. Unpredictable price variations are not necessarily problematic indeed: a consumer can 
take advantage of unexpected prices decreases for instance; and predictable price shifts can be 
problematic for some agents: the post harvest price drop is predictable, but still harmful for farmers 
with liquidity constraints. But when a price shift is detrimental to an agent, it is all the more harmful 
as it is unexpected by this agent. Indeed, “as households and planning agencies are able to cope 
better with predictable variation, unpredictable changes are of primary concern” (Prakash 2011).  
In this paper, we focus on the unpredictable character of price variation. The measurement 
of unpredictable price variability requires to make assumptions on agents’ ability to anticipate price. 
It implies that a same price series is less volatile for well-informed agents than for poorly informed 
agents. We have to choose a level of information supposed to reflect information available to agents, 
and a particular price forecast model supposed to represent agents’ ability to anticipate price.  
Indicators of aggregate price variability like the standard deviation of prices have been used 
widely in the economic literature (Balcombe 2009; Gilbert and Morgan 2010; Huchet-Bourdon 2011), 
but they encompass both the predictable (for example, seasonal price variations) and unpredictable 
components of price variations. To measure price volatility, i.e. isolate the unpredictable component 
of price variations from the predictable one, we need a price forecast model. The series of 
differences between actual prices and modeled prices can be interpreted as volatility. The variance 
of the residuals of a price formation model typically measures the unpredictable price shifts, and this 
variance can be called volatility. After the seminal work of Engle (Engle 1982), several authors have 
used the conditional variance of price as an indicator of price volatility through the use of Auto-
Regressive Conditional Heteroskedastic models (Shively 1996; Barrett 1997; Yang, Haigh et al. 2001; 
Karanja, Kuyvenhoven et al. 2003; Nyange and Wobst 2005; Maîtred'Hôtel, Le Cotty et al. 2013). The 
use of ARCH-family models is adapted to the measurement of volatility, because the variance of 
residual does not need to be constant, and as a consequence the volatility does not need to be a 
single figure, it can be a serie, and the different levels of this series can be interpreted.  
 
Storage as a determinant of food price volatility 
Theoretical models have been developed, notably the competitive storage model  that 
accounts for products that are storable for one year to another and that are subject to random 
production shocks (Gustafson 1958; Cafiero, Bobenrieth et al. 2011). In this model, the demand for 
storage depends on consumption, yields, storage costs and interest rates. It is very clear that in 
general, competitive storage decrease price variations. Nevertheless, competitive storage is more 
efficient for handling price drops than price spikes. Indeed, a  key assumption made is that storage 
cannot be negative, as stocks “cannot be borrowed from the future” (Wright 2011). The implication 
is that, in the event of shortfall, stocks cannot decrease lower than zero and are inefficient in 
mitigating price rises. To our knowledge, there is no direct (with storage data) empirical estimation of 
this storage model effect on price volatility.  A main reason seems to be the scarcity of data series on 
stocks, which strongly constraints empirical estimations of the competitive storage model 
(Bobenrieth, Bobenrieth et al. 2013; Serra and Gil 2013). Indeed, most of the studies on competitive 
storage either skip the use of storage data or use data that are not direct observations but that are 
derived from observations of production, consumption and trade (Abbott 2010). Furthermore, the 
indirect estimation procedure (through price series only) is not fully satisfactory (Deaton and Laroque 
1992).  
In the empirical litterature on the relation between storage and price dynamics, many 
authors have emphasized that periods with low stocks correspond to price spikes (Wiggings and Keat 
2009; Wright 2011).  
At the international level, it is generally acknowledged that periods of low stock levels 
correspond to periods of price spikes. This has been true for each of the last three episodes of low 
grain stock: early 1970S, mid 1990s and late 2000s. When stocks are low, a small production or 
consumption shock can have large price impacts because of more inelastic adjustments (Williams 
and Wright 1991; Gilbert and Morgan 2010).  
At the national level, a majority of empirical studies also come to the conclusion that price 
volatility increases as public inventory decline (Barrett 1997; Nyange and Wobst 2005; Jayne, Myers 
et al. 2008; Serra and Gil 2013). In Kenya, Jayne, Myers and Nyoro adapted a VAR model to assess the 
effect of storage policy on maize prices dynamic : they revealed that stocks held by the National 
Cereal Producers Board significantly reduced price variability (Jayne, Myers et al. 2008). Working on 
nine commodities at the international level, Balcombe estimated both a panel model with annual 
data and an ARCH model with monthly data and established that the use of stock levels consequently 
reduced price volatility (Balcombe 2009). Kim and Chavas studied the US dry milk market and found 
that an increase of public and private stocks will reduce price volatility (Kim and Chavas 2002). 
Simulation approaches have been used to compare a no-storage regime to a storage regime and, 
applied to the soybean prices in USA, it is shown that storage greatly reduces the variance of annual 
prices (Helmberger and Akinyosoye 1984). A particular case occur in situations of shortage leading to 
price peaks, public authorities may decide to “buy high” in order to “sell low” to poor consumers, 
subsidizing food prices and increasing stock levels beyond competitive levels (Gouel 2013) . 
But many other empirical studies question this systematic effect of storage on volatility. In 
Madagascar, Barrett used an ARCH model to analyze rice price volatility and establishes that storage 
had not significant effect on price volatility (Barrett 1997). The application of another ARCH model, 
applied to maize price in Tanzania revealed that storage policies had no effect on price volatility 
while trade policies could contain price volatility (Nyange and Wobst 2005). At the world level, 
Roache came to the result that storage are not found to have a significant impact on price variability  
(Roache 2010). 
The logics ruling storage on-farm differs from the one ruling private inventory. Prices are 
cyclical. They are at their lowest level just after harvest, and then increase until the lean season, 
when they fall again during the new harvest. This price dynamics creates a proper incentives to store 
(Abbott 2010). The “buy low, sell high” principle ruling the competitive storage model may not apply 
to farmers because they have a strong liquidity constraint at harvest time (when prices are low), and 
have a hard time to sell at the lean season when prices are high, because they have a resource 
constraint together with high preference for present. Many poor farmers in Burkina Faso sell low and 
buy high for their own consumption. In the same way, producers may have an incentive to sell when 
prices are high (Fackler and Livingston 2002) but at the same time may need to keep their grain stock 
to smooth family consumption until next harvest, especially in developing countries where 
production and consumption decisions are closely linked. Thus, the competitive storage literature 
singles out price arbitrages, but those price arbitrage may only constitute a partial reason for 
producers to store as they have to meet the needs of their household’s consumption (Saha and 
Stroud 1994). Producers are jointly maximizing profits and minimizing consumption risks and storage 
prevent them from buying food when prices are high (Park 2009). That means that on-farm storage 
can be considered as an insurance for producers against starvation until next harvest (Saha and 
Stroud 1994). If the later models better describe farmers’ storage behavior, they do not go to the 
point of explaining price volatility.  
The ambition of the present paper is to finely describe farmers’ storage behavior in Burkina 
Faso, including the cyclical aspect of production, price and storage on farm, and its  consequences in 
terms of positive and negative volatility. To do so, we first develop a conceptual framework that 
models the dynamics of stocks on a one-year schedule and we illustrate the impact of a late price-
anticipation error on price negative volatility, defined by unexpected price drops. Then, we measure 
empirically some elements of these features, building upon historical price and household data in 
Burkina .  
 
 
2. Conceptual framework : a yearly dynamics of optimal stock outs  
 
Modelling the dynamics of stocks in a seasonal pattern 
We formalize the selling decision of a farmer after harvest. Right after harvest, the farmer 
has a trading plan in mind for the coming year. He sets aside the grain amount that he keeps for 
autoconsumlption and establishes a sales plan for his net production, y, that he wants to sell 
throughout the year. During the first month after harvest he sells a certain amount of grain x1 and 
stores the rest. To calculate this amount, he has to have a sale plan for each of the 11 next months, 
𝑥𝑥�2, … , 𝑥𝑥�12 , which depends on his prices expectation for the 11 months 𝑃𝑃�2, … ,𝑃𝑃�12. The reason why he 
does not sell out the whole crop after harvest is that prices are expected to grow (see figure 2). The 
second month, he takes note of the actual price in month 2, and eventually re-evaluates his sales 
plan. If his price prediction was correct, the plan does not change. If the actual price in month 2 is 
higher than expected, he sells more than he expected one month yearlier, which reduces the amount 
of grain available for sale on the tenth next month. So he establishes a new sales plan. If the actual 
price is below his prediction, he sells less than in his first plan. We recognise that it is possible that 
some farmers maximize their utility over a longer time horizon, which gives a case for resource 
accumulation from one year to another. But in our context, capital accumulation is so small that 
everything happens as if the time horizon of farmers maximisation was the next harvest.  
Furthermore, it is not uncommon that in a particular month, a farmer does not sell at all. We 
integrate this through a reservation price asumption. If the actual price at month t, Pt, drops below 
the reservation price, 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡� , the farmer does not sell at all, xt=0, and the sales plan is re-evaluated. Note 
that if this zero-sale-month occur in month twelve (the month right before harvest), the 
corresponding amount of grain is the carry-over. Without this reservation price mechanism, their 
would be no carry-over as long as the time horizon of the farmer is the next harvest.  So the carry-
over is the amount of crop that the farmer intended in month 11 to sell in month 12 and that he 
finally did not sell. We fin dit more likely that in the absence of unexpected compulsory expenses 
(like medecin tablets) the reservation price is close to the expected price. Litteraly, farmers do not 
want to sell below their expected price. For this reason, we will mainly study the case where  the 
reservation price as equal to the expected price  𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡� = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡� . Because of this reservation price, price 
overestimation and price underestimation have asymetric consequences on sales, thus on prices, but 
this is not necessary to our conclusion that anticipation errors generate volatility. It is necessary for 
having carryover, and for our conclusion on the impact of carry-over on negative volatility.  
The first trading plan of the famer is established right after harvest, upon the observed price 
P1, and a series of future expected sales, that depends on the series of future expected prices 
�𝑃𝑃�2, … ,𝑃𝑃�12 �. The trading plan established in month 1 is a series of hypothetical sales �𝑥𝑥�2, … , 𝑥𝑥�12 � , 
established through the following maximisation program (a discounted CRRA utility function):  
  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = maxx1,x�2…,x�12   (𝑃𝑃1𝑥𝑥1)1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 + 11+𝛿𝛿 (𝑝𝑝�2𝑥𝑥�2)1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 + ⋯+ 1(1+𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡−1 (𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡)1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 + ⋯+ 1(1+𝛿𝛿)11 (𝑝𝑝�12𝑥𝑥�12 )1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝
  (1) 
s.t.  𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥�2 + ⋯+ 𝑥𝑥�12 ≤ 𝑦𝑦   (2) 
∀𝑡𝑡 > 1,    𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0   (3) 
Subscript t stands for month, t=1 corresponds to the harvest month (t=12 corresponds to the last 
month before harvest),  𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡  is expected price for month t as it is planned in month 1.More rigorously, 
this expected price should be given two different time index, like 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡1 but we decided to keep it more 
readible with one time index. Keap in minde that 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡   potentially takes a different value at each 
period. Furthermore, 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  is the producer’s risk aversion, δ is monthly discount rate. Constraint (2) is 
the physical constraint on the total sales. At the end of the year, when the sale sequence is known, 
the carryover is 𝑦𝑦 − 𝑥𝑥1 −⋯− 𝑥𝑥12   . Constraint (3) is the price reservation constraint. It means that at 
each month, the planned sale is nil if the expected price is below the reservation price. The first order 
conditions tot his problem lead to : 
�𝑥𝑥1 = 𝜇𝜇1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃11−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝   ;      ∀𝑡𝑡, 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡 =  𝜇𝜇1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 (1 + 𝛿𝛿)1−𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �  (4) 
where μ1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint (2) as it applies in month 1; and  𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡  is the 
amount of crop that the farmer intends (in month 1) to sell in month t. If expected prices are 
constant, this monthly sale clearly decreases with time throughout the year.   
 
This programm is revised at each period, after information on actual price is made available 
to the farmer: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = maxx𝑡𝑡 ,x�𝑡𝑡+1…,x�12   (𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡)1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 + 11+𝛿𝛿 (𝑝𝑝�𝑡𝑡+1𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡+1)1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 + ⋯+ 1(1+𝛿𝛿)12−𝑡𝑡 (𝑝𝑝�12𝑥𝑥�12 )1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝   (5) 
s.t.  𝑥𝑥1 + 𝑥𝑥2 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 + 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡+1 … + 𝑥𝑥�12 ≤ 𝑦𝑦       (6)  𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡(𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0        (7) 
 
From now, we consider the case where the reservation price is equal to the expected price, 
as explained above, so that constraints (7) turns out to a single inequality, for the present time only. 
The result is as follows: 
�𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
∗ = 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝      𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0    
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡
∗ = 0                   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 < 0 �       (8) 
Where μt is the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (6). If no anticipation error was made since now, 
we can see that  𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 =  𝜇𝜇1(1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡−1.  
If 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 ,  Lagrange multiplier of constraint (7) is nil and Lagrange multiplier of constraint (6) is 
not affected by this prediction error, so that, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ > 𝑥𝑥�𝑡𝑡     .  Because of this, the constraint (6) at the 
t+1 period and following periods will be stiffer than in the farmer’s prediction : 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1 >  𝜇𝜇1(1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡 . 
If 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 < 0    , xt*=0. For t<12, xt*=0 does not imply carryover because a later maximization will 
increase x12. The fact that 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗ = 0  contributes to alleviate the constraint (6) for future periods, and  
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1 <  𝜇𝜇1(1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡 . 
 
The demand side is supposedly generated by a monthly income –whereas supply is 
generated by a yearly income (the harvest) – so that we do not monthly discount utility function of 
food consumption.  
The CRRA utility function of the consumer then writes:  
𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 = max𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐1−𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾(𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡)    (9) 
Where 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡  stands for consumer’s monthly budget, 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  is food demand at month t , r
c is the consumer 
risk aversion, and 𝛾𝛾 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to budget constraint. 
The derivation of this utility function gives the demand for food: 
𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾−1/𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1𝑟𝑟   (10) 
The market clearing results from the above demand function and two types of supply: the 
supply from the imperfectly anticipating farmer described above, xt* , and the supply from a perfectly 
anticipating farmer with similar characteristics, vt. This second source of supply has no consequences 
but stabilizes the market price in case of error anticipation.  
The  market price is the solution of market clearing :  
 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡∗� 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡 ,𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡+1, … ,𝑃𝑃�12� + 𝑣𝑣𝑡𝑡∗� 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 � = 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡∗( 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 )    (12) 
 
This produces two price regimes, depending on price expectation errors.  
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 =
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧
𝛾𝛾− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �𝜇𝜇1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  �1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏� 1−𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 + 𝜈𝜈1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 (1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔) 1−𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ;  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑡𝑡  P𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡    (13)
𝛾𝛾− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �0 + 𝜈𝜈1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 (1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔)− 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐                       ;    𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 < 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡             (14)                    
  
This produces a price re-ajustment at the next period: 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 =
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧
𝛾𝛾− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  + 𝜈𝜈1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 (1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔)− 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ;  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑡𝑡  P𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡    (15)
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1 >  𝜇𝜇1(1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡
𝛾𝛾− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  �1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏� −𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 + 𝜈𝜈1− 1𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 (1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔)− 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 �− 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝+𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐 ;  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 < 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡     (16)
𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡+1 <  𝜇𝜇1(1 + 𝛿𝛿)𝑡𝑡                     
  
Where 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏 , and 𝛿𝛿𝑔𝑔     stand for the discount rate of the bad and the good anticipating farmers 
respectively.  
At any time of the year t, an overestimation of the next period price,  𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 < 𝑃𝑃�𝑡𝑡+2, produces 
a price increase in the next period (equation 14). But it also increases the total amount of available 
resource, which induces a greater sale in the following periods, which produces a price decrease in 
the following period at a level below the level that was expected in period t (equation 15). This can 
be seen in the simulations below (figure 3).  
When such an overestimation happens in the lean season, for instance in period 11 the 
farmer overestimates period 12 prices, this produces a carryover at the end of period 12, which 
amplifies the price drop in the first period of following year, and simulated (figure 5).  
 
Simulating the effect of price anticipation errors 
Simulations below illustrate above result. Any succession of anticipation errors produces 
volatility. But when errors of price overestimation occur before the end of the new harvest, they also 
produce carry-over that amplifies prices unexpected drops for the new campaign.  
Simulation parameters 
y 1200 kg 
rp 0,9 
rc 0,8 
γ 0,8 
μ1                 (𝜇𝜇1 = 𝑥𝑥1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡1−𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 ) 0,02 
μ8               (if overestimation at t=7) 0,015 
μ1, year 2 (overestimation at t=12) 0,015 
ν1 0,01 
δb 0,05 
δg 0,01 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Supply after price overestimation in month 7 
 
 
Figure 3. Market price after price overestimation in month 7 
 
 
Figure 4. Supply after price overestimation at month 12 (carryover) 
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Figure 5. Market price after price overestimation at month 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Empirical strategy : method 
 
Our procedure to test the asymmetric effect of carry-out on price volatility uses two stages. 
First for each village, we build a series of positive volatility made of positive unexpected shocks of 
price and a series of negative volatility made of negative unexpected price shocks.  The definition of 
unexpected shocks is derived from the ARCH- model (see Engle, Shiveley, Barrett). An autoregressive 
model of price is estimated to model what is expected in prices movements, through information of 
past levels of price, seasonality, trend, and geographical dummies. The residuals form the series of 
unexpected shocks, but the variance of these is generally – as in our case – heteroscedastic , ie 
correlated with past shocks. This variance is a good measure of volatility, defined as the variance of 
unpredictably price shifts, which takes a different value at each period (month).  
Second, we build a panel of these monthly time series of volatility for each village, merged 
with the yearly carry-over in each village at the end of campaign. The effect of the latter on the next 
campaign negative volatility gives the effect of carryout on volatility.  
 
Estimating positive and negative maize price volatility  
ARCH models are used to characterize and model observed time series (Engle 1982). ARCH 
modeling allows simultaneous estimation of temporal variation in the conditional mean and variance 
of a dependent variable, in this paper namely the deflated maize producer price. The analysis of the 
error term of the mean equation at any time t provides useful information to interpret price 
volatility. In particular, when the variance of the error term of the mean equation is not 
homoscedastic, this variance can increase with the lagged values of the error term of the mean price 
equation, and the –conditional – variance is interpreted as a measure of price volatility. This is 
basically what is done in this paper. The ARCH model general structure is as follows.  
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where the subscripts i and t stand for region and monthly period respectively.  
month (t) 
price (Francs CFA /kg) 
Equation (1) is the mean equation that determines the maize producer price pit process as an 
autoregressive process of 1 period, and depending from seasonal dummies and geographical 
dummies. Sit is the dummy for Shortage season, going from June to August, Ait is the Abunduncy 
season, going from October to December, and Gk is a geographical dummy for village k. Seasons have 
been selected after testing monthly dummies on each of the 16 price series. The one period lag for 
price autoregression has been selected after testing the number of significant periods on each 
individual market. Trend variable has been removed because of very low significativity. Equation (2) 
determines the conditional variance of the error term of equation (1), as a function of recent past 
shocks (namely last period shock) and confirms the significant ARCH nature of the price process in 9 
out of the 16 villages (see results). In the 7 remaining villages, the price process proves 
autoregressive with homoscedastic variance. Many other specifications could have been tested for 
each village, but our aim here was mainly to get series of variance for each village, and to compare 
the behaviour of these series, which supposes to keep a common basic specification for each price 
series.  
Above estimations have been led for the 16 markets so as to get 16 series of volatilities hit. 
Next, these series have been segregated in two groups of series, ones with positive volatily, one with 
negative volatility. The segregation is processed as follows: 
The estimated conditional variance ithˆ  is a panel of i time series providing i series of 
volatility. If it is clear that the level of carry-over is likely to influence these series of measures 
volatility, it is likely that carryovers do not affect positive price shocks in the same way as negative 
price shocks.  Contrarily to the speculators’ stocks which can increase or decrease, farmers do not 
buy cereals when the cereals prices drop. They simply sell cereals when prices increase. This makes 
an important difference because whereas speculators’ stocks can smoothen positive price shocks 
(buy selling) and negative price shocks (by buying), farmers’ stocks are not expected to smoothen 
negative prices shocks.  
To check this, we segregate our volatility time series in two series for each market: one for 
positive price shocks and one for negative price shocks.  
We denote  
+
ijh the sub-series extracted from ith  where 0≥itε  and 
−
ijh  the sub-series where 
0≤itε . And because carry-over is a yearly data, we build a yearly variable of  positive volatility and a 
yearly variable of negative volatility, for each market i and each year j, i.e.  
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Where  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝  is the number of observations in year j and in area i where ε𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 
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Where   𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛  is the number of observations in year j and in area i where ε𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ≤ 0 
 Measuring the effect of anticipation errors on carryover 
The empirical estimation of equation (7) gives the effect of the two types of volatility on 
carryover.  
 +−− +++= ijjijiji hayacaac ˆ. 31,21,10,  
−
−− +++= ijjijiji hbybcbbc ˆ. 31,21,10,  
Where jic , is the amount of carryover at the end of year j and 1, −jiy is the production in year j-1.  
Equation (7) predicts b3 >0 (negative volatility increases carryover) and a3 =0 (positive volatility does 
not impact carryover).  
 
Measuring the effect of carry-over on prices shocks  
We then estimate the effect of storage on these two kinds of volatility, after Balcombe. We 
consider here the effect of carryover of year j-1 on volatility in year j; The associate coefficient e3 and 
f3 supposes that the effect of the stock is proportional to the amount of this stock. Prices are all the 
more stable as the total stock is large.  
The following panel is estimated with an Arellano and Bond GMM estimation.  
1,31,21,10
ˆ.ˆ −−
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Where i index stands for the market, j index stands for the year, yi,j-1 is the lagged production in 
village i, πi,j-1 is the proportion of farmers with nil carryover at the end of year j-1. We have chosen 
this measure of carryover instead of the amount of carryover because a carryover in one farm is 
unpredictable for another farm. The average amount of carryover is less unpredictable because 
those farmers who keep carryover know that the price in next period is likely to drop.  
Equation (9) predicts f3<0 (the proportion of farmers with nil carryover decreases negative 
volatility) and e3=0 (the proportion of farmers with carryover does not increase positive volatility).   
 
 
4. Empirical strategy: Data 
 
Historical maize price data  
In Burkina Faso, SONAGESS (Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité) is collecting 
data on consumer, retail and producer prices on 48 markets, and communicating those data on a 
monthly basis. We used a subset of 16 temporal series where maize producer prices are available for 
the period mid 2004-mid 2013. Those markets are located in the southern regions of the country, 
less affected by drought, where  maize production is quite an important activity for producers (in the 
northern regions, millet and sorghum are the main crop produced). Those 16 markets are 
represented in Figure6. Each one of those markets corresponds to a different administrative level 
named province. There are 45 provinces in Burkina Faso.  
 
Figure 6. Localization of the 16 markets studied in Burkina Faso(from the authors) 
 
 
Monthly price data have then been deflated by the use of burkinabè Consumer Price Index, 
obtained from INSD (Institut National des Statistiques Démographiques). The evolution of maize 
producer real prices on the 16 markets is represented in Figure 7.  
Figure7. Evolution of maize real prices (Data sources: SONAGESS AND INSD) 
 
 
 
What we can learn from Figure 2 is that :  
• Prices are affected by seasonal patterns : they are at their highest points around july-
september, before harvest, which correspond in Burkina to what is called the “soudure” 
period and after harvest, around october-december they are at their lower points.  
• Beyong those seasonal variations, price rises followed by price falls were quite pronunced in 
2005, 2008, 2009 and 2012. Those phenomenons are mainly linked to poor harvest periods, 
related to the event of acridian invasions (2005) or drough (2009 and 2012) and probably 
combined to international price spikes (2008, 2012). The 2005 price spike is more pronunced 
than the other ones.  
• Prices follow quite a similar dynamics from one market to one another, even if prices seam 
to present slightly higher or lower levels for some markets, as it appears in Table 1 
representing basic descriptive statistics obtained from the 16 time series we used.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the prices observed on the 16 markets studied                        (from 
SONAGESS and INSD data) 
 Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Battie 105 103,520517 23,8905005 54,3568359 197,295223 
Douna 105 65,5695045 17,4782981 36,1708631 121,234597 
Fara 105 75,8888256 18,0049969 42,5653664 140,972345 
Faramana 104 70,3150479 19,1369529 37,8342021 142,205264 
Founza 77 70,4319972 14,3278841 40,4455339 99,7089441 
Gaoua 105 104,977494 17,1856137 64,6690139 175,840989 
Guelwongo 101 110,554732 21,7612417 73,282273 204,695252 
Hamele 73 92,8393789 22,7648739 44,8269687 166,225442 
Kompienga 77 75,3655603 14,3747573 47,9464131 126,501945 
Manga 105 104,600166 22,0939336 66,7406107 195,575586 
Ndorola 83 58,1559524 13,4756142 33,5959222 83,8978136 
Ouargaye 105 82,4515923 17,8870714 47,3618116 145,482477 
Sapouy 105 90,0946762 23,1543589 50,9567356 182,526671 
Solenzo 105 76,2479912 20,3845846 46,3828587 146,833894 
Zabre 104 101,137333 19,2095734 60,911938 169,443407 
Ziniare 78 104,876839 14,943425 73,8579508 135,80676 
 
Household surveys and on farm-storage data  
The burkinabè Ministry of Agriculture is collecting data on agricultural production since 1992, 
trough the implementation of the EPA (Enquête Permanente Agricole), which consists of a detailed 
survey where once a year an average number of 4500 rural households are interviewed and their 
agricultural production is measured. The EPA relies upon a stratification method by administrative 
levels and inside those administrative levels upon randomized methods thus interviewed households 
are expected to be representative from burkinabè rural households. To combine household survey 
data with price data, we used a subset of EPA data available that corresponds to the 16 different 
provinces for which we observed maize producer price data. From t-his subset, we have been 
working of two main variables of interest: the annual maize production, and the amount of stock that 
households still have before the new harvest comes. Individual data have been aggregated at the 
level of the provinces.  
The final panel database we have been working on was made of 16 markets observed trough 
8 years. The two panels are estimated through the generalized moments method, using the Arellano 
and Bond procedure. The instruments used for the estimation are the lagged production and the 
lagged prices as predetermined variables, and the dummy variables of fixed market- effects for the 
exogenous variables. Tables 2 describes the variables we have been working on.   
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the panel estimations                                (from 
EPA, SONAGESS and INSD data) 
Variable N Moyenne Ecart-type Minimum Maximum 
positive volatility 105,00 109,97 11,34 93,68 130,11 
negative volatility 105,00 114,62 18,48 94,68 149,71 
lagged production 93,00 1439,51 1932,82 23,00 12960,00 
lagged  proportion of 
farms with carry-over 
90,00 0,70 0,45 0 1,00 
real price 97,00 84,52 19,36 42,16 122,92 
lagged stock share 75,00 49,13 204,18 0,00 1620,75 
 
 
5. Empirical strategy : Results 
 
Characterization of maize price volatility in Burkina Faso  
The mean equation shows that the maize price follows an autoregressive process with a 
highly significant and strong monthly autocorrelation. Pre-harvest price (shortage season) is 
significantly higher and post harvest price (abundance season) is significantly lower than the rest of 
the year. These results are consistent with the ones of Shively (1996) and Barrett (1997) and Karanja 
et al (2003) and all farmers talks in Burkina Faso.  For a deflated price index which means is around 
100 (depending on the markets) the seasonal average difference between high and low season is 
only ten. This unique definition of seasonality for each village underestimates price seasonality. A 
specific work on this issue where we use monthly dummies instead of trimestriel dummies exhibits 
higher difference between low season and high season.  
The ARCH1 term confirms that the price process is correctly described by an ARCH model. 
The variance of the residuals is increased by high recent values of the residuals.  
One example of ARCH result is given for the Battie market in Table 3. The second row of 
Table 3 corresponds to the results of the estimation of the mean equation (price level is the 
dependent variable) while the third row gives us the results of the estimation of the conditional 
variance equation (price volatility is the dependent variable).  
 
 
Table 3. ARCH estimation results for the Battie market 
 
 
Figure 8 gives a representation of the evolution of maize price volatility in the 16 markets 
studied.  
Figure 8. Evolution of maize price volatility in Burkina Faso ( being the indicator) 
 
 
It appears that maize price volatility differs from one market to one other and from one period to 
one another. The sharp rise of prices observed by mid 2005 on the majority of markets (see Figure 2) 
corresponds to an episode of high volatility in a restricted number of markets. Compared to 2005, 
volatility is then quite narrow, even if episodes in 2008, 2009 and 2012 can be identified.  
 
                                                                              
       _cons      73.5973   19.00031     3.87   0.000     36.35737    110.8372
              
         L1.     .9511485   .2197542     4.33   0.000     .5204382    1.381859
        arch  
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       _cons     35.65672   8.168469     4.37   0.000     19.64682    51.66663
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      Battie        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -413.1054                         Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2(3)    =    173.22
Sample: 2004m8 - 2013m3                            Number of obs   =       104
ARCH family regression
Table 4. Descriptive statistics on maize price volatility ( ) 
 
 
Distinction between positive and negative prices shocks 
From the results obtained trough ARCH models, we then splitted volatility into positive and 
negative dynamics. Figure 9 presents the distribution of positive residuals across the year for the 
different markets and different years, and Figure 10 gives us the distribution of negative residuals 
across the year for the different markets and different years.  
Figure 9. Positive price shocks around the year (1 for January, 12 for December) 
 
This graph illustrates that the probability of large positive price shocks is not equal around 
the year (this is also an illustration of the heteroskedasticity of those residuals justifying the ARCH 
model). Note that this uneven distribution remains after prices series have been de-seasonalized (see 
the first equation of the ARCH model = mean equation). It is clear that prices are in average higher in 
June but in addition to that, unexpected prices shocks also happen most frequently in June and July.  
By contrast the similar graph below of negative volatility illustrates that negative prices 
shocks occur mainly in October, when prices drop.  
     VolaZin          105    58.70742     1.22166        56.28482    61.13001
                                                                             
     VolaZab          105    113.8488    7.773605        98.43344    129.2641
     VolaSol          105    112.6529    .3198998        112.0185    113.2872
     VolaSap          105    181.6782    28.17667        125.8028    237.5536
    VolaOuar          105    104.5493    4.324214        95.97417    113.1243
     VolaNdo          105    56.92118    2.044931          52.866    60.97635
                                                                             
     VolaMan          105    139.0367    10.45249         118.309    159.7644
     VolaKom          105    86.10438    8.977762        68.30114    103.9076
     VolaHam          105    116.9342    .4195357        116.1023    117.7662
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     VolaBat          105     257.638    47.17805        164.0821    351.1938
                                                                             
    Variable          Obs        Mean    Std. Err.       [95% Conf. Interval]
Figure 10. Negative price shocks around the year(1 for January, 12 for December) 
 
These graphs are to show that the carry-over (measured in September, before harvest) have 
no reason to impact positive volatility and negative volatility in the same way. Whereas the peak of 
volatility in June-July will probably be smoothen for the years or the villages where carry-over remain 
(thus increasing sales and reducing the peak), it is not clear why remaining carry-over in September 
would reduce the price drop in October. In fact, the opposite is expected.  
 
The effect of anticipation errors on carryover 
Our model predicts that carry-over at the end of farming year j should be nil if volatility is low 
in year j and the amount of carry-over should be large if in case of unpredictable price drops. This is 
confirmed by results below.  
Estimation results 
Variable  estimates  t-test Pr > |t| 
Intercept  15.37582  0.17 0.8699 
Lagged price overestimation  1.952934  2.44 0.0246 
Lagged production  0.094342  1.89 0.0748 
Lagged carryover  0.382589  4.65 0.0002 
 
Sargan test confirms the improvement of estimation with chosen instruments. 
Thus negative volatility increases the amount of carry-over, which is as predicted by equation 
(7). Equation (7) has been set as a function of errors of anticipation of p12 only, but it can be shown 
that anticipation errors occurring at earlier periods produce the same result.  
By contrast, the effect of positive volatility on carry-over as predicted by the model is nil, 
which is an interesting support to the theoretical framework: carryover is not planned by farmers. It 
if were, positive price shocks would modify this plan into selling more, hence reducing the amount of 
carryover, which is not what we observe here. In terms of equation (7), positive shocks simply 
maintain the planned sales schedule where carryover=0.  
Variable estimate t-test Pr > |t| 
Intercept 129.3986 1.44 0.1665 
Lagged price underestimation 0.162853 0.23 0.8243 
Lagged production 0.099777 1.96 0.0643 
Lagged carryover 0.39421 4.70 0.0002 
 
The effect of carryover on volatility in Burkina Faso  
The positive effect of carryover on next year negative volatility is small. However, if we 
replace the amount of carryover by the proportion of farmers who have strictly positive carryover, 
this proxy of carryover has a positive effect on negative volatility at the 1% level.  
Estimation results 
Variable  Valeur estimée  Valeur 
du test t 
Pr > |t| 
Intercept  29.52  4.96 <.0001 
Lagged negative volatility  0.114  3.06 0.006 
Lagged production  -0.00371  -1,54 0.1398 
Lagged proportion of carryover  90,14  7,64 <0.001 
 
The effect of carryover on positive volatility does not appear significant, or, in some trials, 
appears positive, as if carryover at the end of year j could contribute to increase positive volatility of 
prices in year j+1. Although not impossible, this is not explained by the model at this stage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Most of the research on agricultural prices volatility has focused on international markets, 
and most of the research on stocks as a determinant of volatility has focused on stocks held by public 
authorities or private traders. The influence of stocks held by agricultural producers themselves on 
domestic price volatility has received little attention in the economic literature. In this paper, we 
focus on maize price volatility in a developing country, Burkina Faso, and we analyze the relationship 
between the levels of stocks held by farmers and volatility levels observed on different local markets, 
differentiating between negative and positive prices shocks. 
Our results are twofold. First, we show that unanticipated price movements during the crop 
season can be responsible for the existence of on farm stocks at the end of the crop season. 
Carryover is explained by volatility more than by price level. Unexpected price drops tend to 
decrease instant supply and delay global supply. When this occurs at the end of the cropping season, 
and if farmers actually have an implicit minimal price to accept selling, this generates carryover. On 
the contrary, unexpected price increase does not seem to impact carryover because, as is already 
mentioned in the literature on inventory, agents cannot sell more than they have, whatever the 
increase in price. Second, we show that the existence at the end of the crop season of stocks held by 
farmers was a potentially determinant factor in the collapse of post-harvest prices. Carryover tends 
to increase the negative volatility of the next year, because it brings more commodity on the market 
that other agents (farmers with no carryover for instance) can forecast, creating an over sale. 
If we want to avoid massive price drops after harvest, our results appeal for the implementation 
of policy measures to ensure that on-farm stocks will be nil at the end of the year or to ensure that 
farmers would be enable to hold their production just after harvest. Two objectives can be followed :  
• Enable farmers a better access to market information and notably markets prices, trough 
more available MIS and better infrastructures. This better access should result in lowering 
anticipation errors on prices and then avoid situations where farmers have consistent carry-
over at the end of the year.  
• Promote on-farm storage just after harvest, in order to smooth both price drops after 
harvests and extreme price increases at the end of the season. This is quite a challenge in the 
context of developing countries because at the harvest period, farmers need liquidity so they 
tend to sell a major part of their production, even if the prices are at their lowest point. Thus, 
encourage storage through subsidization of storage infrastructures in the villages must be 
accompanied by measures to facilitate farmers access to credit, in order to meet the liquidity 
needs of farmers. Warehouse receipt systems are expanding among developing countries, 
precisely because those systems allow farmers both access to liquidity after harvests and a 
better remuneration for their activity because they can store their products and sell latter in 
the year, when prices are higher. Those systems are of great interest to consumers as well, 
because they tend to stabilize food prices.  
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